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Abstract
The paper advances a realist analytical model for case studies of national soft power policies. 
First, it argues that for the purposes of realist analysis, a soft power policy must be considered as 
a rational strategy pursued under the conditions of competition. Furthermore, it emphasises the 
importance of taking into account the specificities of the recipient state as well as the fact that a 
soft power strategy is targeted at both its elite and its public. In addition, the article substantiates 
the necessity to draw a clear-cut distinction between soft power sources and instruments and shows 
possible shortcomings that research can have should this distinction fail to be made. Finally, the 
paper discusses the impact of a competitor’s presence on a soft power strategy and specifies the 
terms under which disregarding this impact may engender a wrong conclusion.
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 Introduction
Twenty-six years after Joseph Nye (1990) coined the term “soft power” and 
put forward the respective theory, it seems to have gained great popularity 
among not only scholars, but also journalists and policymakers. Once 
designed mostly for describing US policies, it has later been modified in a 
way that makes it applicable to analysing the foreign policy of practically 
any state, be it a global or a regional power, or even a small and weak 
country. The concept’s popularity apparently originates from the fact that 
the information age is fraught with, first, big temptation and, second, many 
possibilities to influence foreign states through attraction and persuasion 
rather than coercion, which enables even militarily weak states to be 
influential.
The spread of the concept has made it popular to do research on the 
assessment of national policies that aim at ameliorating a country’s image 
in a certain overseas territory.1 The most common method in this type of 
research is a qualitative case study which, as a rule, focuses on why state 
A needs a good image in country B, how this image is shaped, and what 
opportunities and workable ways country A has to enhance its reputation in 
state B. However, without casting any doubt on the deployment of the case 
study method to the analysis of soft power policies, I argue that the analytical 
model used in such case studies frequently fails to correspond to their goals 
and, hence, needs better specification. The main reason for this, to my 
mind, is that Nye’s so-called “agent-centered” approach, where attention 
is focused primarily on the state that wields soft power, mostly suits the liberal 
paradigm of IR theory,2 the basic premise of which is that countries seek to 
maximise their absolute gains. For soft power policies, this implies that various 
countries’ peculiarities hardly really matter for country A’s strategies toward 
them, and third parties’ role in this process is of minor, if any, significance. In 
reality, however, as the realist paradigm assumes, many states, especially 
global and regional powers, are engaged in a geopolitical rivalry, aspiring to 
maximise their relative gains. For soft power policies, this implies that countries 
1 Since such a “territory” can vary from a region within a country to a macro-region, hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, 
I refer to it as “country”.
2 Joseph Nye himself, however, believes that soft power as a concept is in tune with the realist (Nye 2011a: 17–18) as well 
as liberal and constructivist approaches to IR (Nye 2009: 219).
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try to improve their international image not in general, but, rather, relatively 
to their competitors’ image. I argue that in order to study soft power policies 
through the prism of the realist paradigm, the actual list of the factors to be 
considered in a case study analysis has to be clarified and extended. By 
contending this, I endeavour to move forward the ideas of several other 
scholars who criticise Nye’s soft power concept for being too “unstrategic” 
as an analytical category (Lock 2009) and generally insufficient for a realist 
analysis of interstate relations (Bilgin and Eliş 2008; Fan 2008).
This paper aims to clarify a “realist” analytical model for country-focused 
case studies, in which a national soft power policy is deemed a rational 
strategy under the conditions of interstate competition. I call the model 
“aggregative”, since it embraces features peculiar to three types of actors: 
the “applicant” (the state that conducts a soft power strategy), the “recipient” 
(the state a soft power strategy aims at), and competitors (states whose soft 
power strategies towards the same recipient aim at goals that are contrary 
to the applicant’s ones). The model puts forward three major arguments: 
1) the particularities of the recipient as well as the attitudes of both its elite 
and public must be taken into account; 2) researchers must draw a clear 
distinction between the applicant’s soft power potential (sources) and the 
means it uses to achieve strategic goals (instruments) and take them both 
into consideration; 3) the applicant’s strategy, where necessary, must be 
considered in light of the competition with other applicants. 
Structurally, the paper follows the logic of the coverage of the above-
mentioned points. In Section 2, I define a soft power strategy, describe its goals 
and the actors engaged as well as discuss the importance of considering the 
recipient’s distinctive features – its elite and its public – as units of analysis in 
case study research. My points are also exemplified by references to papers 
which, in my opinion, would have benefited from having had my arguments 
taken into account in their analytical models. Section 3 is focused on the 
significance of differentiating between the sources and instruments of a soft 
power strategy. In Section 4, I elaborate on the importance of considering 
the presence of a competitor for the assessment of the applicant’s soft power 
strategy and specify the conditions under which the factor of competition 
cannot be omitted in a case study. The final section, Conclusions, summarises 
the results of the study and proposes possible topics for further analysis.
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Soft Power Strategy: Definition, Goal, and Actors 
Involved
As a concept, soft power has undergone certain changes since it was 
created. Actually, one can distinguish between at least two interpretations 
of soft power. In its narrowest understanding, which is in tune with Nye’s 
initial definition (1990), soft power is just the power of attractiveness, a 
capability to “get others to want what you want” (167) with your good 
reputation and positive image. However, his latest definition of soft power 
defines the concept in much broader terms, as “the ability to affect 
others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing 
the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction” (2011a: 19). In fact, this 
re-definition has generated some confusion over the concept among 
scholars (Fan 2008: 148), even though Nye’s personal conception of soft 
power seems to have always been the same: to influence someone with 
the use of soft power means to be capable of getting from her what you 
want without any resort to payment or coercion.
Not only the definition in particular, but even the general idea of soft 
power has been caviled at due to its arguably limited applicability to 
analysing national foreign policies. Its critics argue that, first, governments 
are unable to fully control soft power (Ifantis 2012: 443), second, to predict 
its efficiency is hard due to local peculiarities in every recipient country 
(Seiichi 2015: 192), and, third, it appears scarcely possible to measure 
and quantify it (Xiangping 2016: 307). Even Joseph Nye himself (2011b: 
83) admits that “incorporating soft power into a government strategy” is 
hard due to three reasons: its outcome is too contingent on the target, 
to achieve visible results takes a lot of time, and the instruments are not 
totally controlled by governments. To my mind, however, all this does not 
mean that the concept of soft power is useless and must be discarded, 
as some have proposed (see, for example, Hall 2010). In the end, from the 
viewpoint of common sense, it is, of course, true that nobody can manage 
what others think of them, but it is equally true that everyone can always 
do something to improve their reputation, and that is exactly what states 
try to do in international relations. Nye (2011) himself distinguishes between 
passive and active approaches to soft power: the former presupposes 
affecting others “like the light shining from ‘a city on the hill’”, the latter 
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implies making “active efforts to create attraction” (94), in other words, 
conducting a deliberate strategy.
Though a clear definition of soft power strategy has yet to appear in the 
academic literature, this term has been widely used in the meaning of 
a coherent and purposeful set of actions aimed to improve a country’s 
image abroad (for examples of the concept’s application in leading 
academic journals, see Lee 2009; Watson 2013; Ogunnubi and Okeke-
Uzodike 2015; Sergunin and Karabeshkin 2015). As previously stated, 
the state that pursues a soft power strategy can be called “applicant” 
(Lee 2009: 211–212), some authors also call it “sender” (D’Hooghe 2010: 
2), “agent” (Hayden 2012: 41; Vyas 2011: 45–48), or “wielder” (Altunişik 
2008: 41; Nadkarni 2013: 143), while the country that the strategy aims at is 
called “recipient” (Sun 2012: 13–14; Lee 2009: 211–212; Lee 2011: 140) or, in 
other papers, “subject” (Hayden 2012: 41), “receiver” (D’Hooghe 2010: 2), 
“target” (Nye 2011b: 84). This distinction, however, lacks academic clarity, 
since all forms of social power involve a two-way relationship (see Barnett 
and Duvall 2005), which in practice implies that when the applicant 
affects the recipient with its soft power, she also gets, in turn, influenced 
by the soft power of the latter. Therefore, some authors suggest referring 
to both sides of the soft power interaction as “clients”, pointing to the fact 
that, as distinct from the hard power relationship, where “the target is the 
passive or unwilling participant”, in the case of soft power “both parties 
are willing participants” (Vuving 2009: 8). To be precise, those authors are 
right. However, in my opinion, for scientific convenience it is reasonable 
to differentiate between applicants and recipients in order to avert 
confusion between the subject and the object of research.
Considering Recipient’s Distinctive Features
My argument in this section is that taking into account the distinctive 
features of the recipient is indispensable in case studies of the applicant’s 
soft power strategy. Admittedly, this point might sound rather banal; 
moreover, it has already been, at least partially, suggested by several 
other scholars (see Lock 2009; Vyas 2011; Kudryavtsev 2014). However, I 
still put it forward here once again, for it needs better exemplification and 
specification.
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There are, in my opinion, at least two reasons for taking regional 
specificities into consideration. First of all, various recipients can perceive 
the same features of the applicant differently, even when the applicant’s 
soft power strategies toward them are identical. This can also be the case 
with regard to different regions of the same recipient country, particularly 
if it includes autonomous areas with various types of minorities. A concrete 
list of factors that affect a strategy’s overall perception in a country or a 
region includes its ethnic, linguistic and religious composition, its political 
regime, the applicant-recipient bilateral relations in the past, other social 
and cultural factors. A good example illustrating the importance of such 
factors is contemporary Ukraine, where people are highly split over the 
attitude to the EU and Russia: to illustrate, in 2015, in West Ukraine, 72% of 
the citizenry believed that the EU must be Ukraine’s main partner and 61% 
considered Russia a major threat, while in East Ukraine such views were 
shared by only 39% and 30% of people respectively (Simmons, Stokes 
and Poushter 2015: 37–41). This difference apparently originates in religion 
(West Ukrainians are mostly catholic whereas in the East orthodoxy is 
more widespread), language (in East Ukraine, Russian is more popular 
than Ukrainian, while in the West it is vice versa), history (in contrast to East 
Ukraine, the Western part was historically more connected to Poland and 
Hungary than to Russia) etc. Therefore, the failure to consider regional 
peculiarities may lead to an erroneous conclusion: a soft power strategy, 
which is successful in one country, can misfire in a region that differs in its 
internal conditions. In other words, the reason for a strategy’s failure or 
success can lie in the recipient’s specificities rather than the features of 
the strategy itself.
In addition, applicants themselves tend to adjust their soft power strategies 
to particular recipients, which can be reflected, first of all, in the intensity of 
activities: states normally pursue particularly active foreign policies in their 
neighbourhoods due to having special strategic interests there. Russia, for 
instance, is particularly active in its “near abroad” (Tarufo 2014: 4), which 
is even reflected in its Concept of Foreign Policy stating that CIS countries 
are of utmost strategic importance (MFA of Russia 2013). Poland’s most 
intensive soft power activities centre on Belarus and Ukraine, owing to 
their cultural and historical proximity as well as the political and economic 
significance of those states for Poland (Sadowski 2015: 77).
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Besides intensity, regional peculiarities can also have an effect on the 
content of a strategy. For example, if certain values of the recipient are 
too contradictory to the applicant’s ones, the latter often prefer not to 
emphasise them greatly, otherwise the whole strategy’s success will be 
put at stake. Critics often call this approach a “double standards” policy 
and accuse it of being immoral; however, in fact, it reflects a mere 
rational interest to win “hearts and minds”. Examples of such “double 
standards” abound. The US often expresses serious concern about human 
rights violations in Iran, but does it less strongly and frequently with regard 
to Saudi Arabia, its partner in the Middle East. Conservative Russia tends 
to criticize the EU and the US for promoting LGBT rights, but never does 
the same when it comes to Brazil and South Africa, its BRICS partners that 
have also legalized same-sex marriage.
I would also like to cite examples of the papers where regional peculiarities 
are disregarded, which, to my mind, leads to distorted conclusions. One 
study, entitled “Limits to Russian soft power in the post-Soviet area” (Ćweik-
Kaprowicz 2012) and dedicated to the shortcomings of the Russian soft 
power strategy with regards to that territory, describes the Russian policy in 
the whole post-Soviet area, but assesses its reception only in its East European 
part, mostly in the Baltic states, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. Naturally, 
should the author have looked at other countries of the region, like Belarus 
or Armenia, or the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia, he would have 
discovered a much warmer perception of the same Russian policies, which 
probably would have made him admit that the overall soft power of Russia 
in the region actually has a much greater potential than what his research 
concludes. Another article, devoted to the Chinese “global” soft power 
strategy, optimistically concludes that China’s “peaceful rise” strategy is 
so successful that it “has generated an international platform for Beijing to 
share its opinion on key international issues and garner increased respect 
on a global scale” (Ding 2010: 271). Even if this is true, and the overall image 
of China may indeed have improved in the last several years, I believe that 
the article should at least have mentioned that the regional receptions of 
China in the world vary noticeably. It especially matters in the case of the 
Western countries (the US, the EU) as well as a number of China’s neighbours 
(Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines) who view China mostly in negative 
terms (Pew Research Center 2014: 26–27), which, actually, complicates its 
“peaceful rise” in strategically important regions. 
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Finally, regional specificities are discounted in now popular soft power 
rankings or indices (see, for example, Ernst & Young 2012; McClory 
2015) designed to estimate national attraction by summing up its main 
components, the selection of which sometimes appears quite equivocal. 
For instance, one of them includes “literacy rates” as a compound variable 
(McClory 2015: 50), which, in my opinion, in the contemporary period, 
may be topical for some developing countries, but can hardly serve as 
an indicator of attractiveness among citizens of developed states, where 
literacy is common and, hence, taken for granted. Another component 
of soft power in that index is democracy and civil liberties, which seems 
even more moot: a great part of the world’s citizens, especially in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East feel quite indifferent to these values, which 
becomes apparent in opinion polls (see, for example, Wike and Simmons 
2015: 13). In other words, when it comes to attracting particular people, 
democracy can be of great importance, but considering it to be a 
universally accepted value seems wishful thinking.
Who Is Affected by Soft Power: Taking Account of Elites and 
Publics
As follows from the theory, the main goal of “soft empowerment” is to 
change the recipient government’s preferences in a way favourable for 
the applicant (Gallarotti 2011: 35–37). In Nye’s view, there are two possible 
ways to achieve this: the applicant either directly affects the recipient’s 
elite, or it attracts the recipient’s public, which, in turn, will create such 
an “enabling or disabling environment” that, in the end, will lead to a 
preferred elite decision (Nye 2011b: 94–95). A question that logically arises 
from the first model is whether or not a decision can be taken by a leader 
without the consent of the public. Should we assume that it is so, then a 
process of attraction takes place purely in the form of intergovernmental 
negotiations; put differently, a soft power strategy is identical to traditional 
diplomacy. If, contrariwise, we suppose that the consent of the public is 
generally needed for a political decision to be taken, then soft power 
strategies must be applied via various means directed at the recipient’s 
public. A quick look at some empirical studies makes it clear that public 
opinion on foreign policy issues is salient in a limited number of cases –s for 
example, when it becomes “activated” due to the extreme unpopularity 
of a particular decision (Powlick 1995), in crisis situations (Knecht and 
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Weatherford 2006), in the policy selection stage of foreign policy decision-
making (Foyle 1999), and in case a foreign policy decision is of particularly 
extraordinary importance (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012). In other 
situations, public opinion can normally be, irrespectively of a country’s 
political regime, either manipulated or quite easily ignored by leaders. 
In general, the peculiarity of foreign policy is that citizens normally take 
much less interest in it than in domestic affairs, which makes it easier for 
leaders to “shape” public opinion as they need (see, for example, Heith 
2004; Jacobs and Burns 2004; Jacobs and Page 2005).
This all has an important implication for case studies: to assess the success 
of the applicant’s soft power strategy, its reception by both the recipient’s 
elite and population must be taken into account. If a soft power strategy, 
in tune with Nye’s understanding of soft power, is to be regarded as 
seeking a positive image not for its own sake, but for certain political goals, 
then considering both receivers of soft power, namely foreign leaders and 
publics (Nye 2008: 107), is crucial. As a matter of fact, dealing with purely 
the recipient’s public can also benefit the applicant in certain ways, such 
as attracting investors, tourists, students, and workforce from that country, 
and so forth; however, to achieve a favourable political decision this way 
generally seems hard and will frequently be impossible.
There are plentiful examples of situations in which, due to the influence of 
another state’s soft power, leaders have taken political decisions that were 
running counter to public opinion. In some cases, this influence is mainly 
normative: this happens, for instance, when governments have to take 
unpopular steps to meet the prerequisites for accession to an international 
organization or a treaty. For example, in 2014–2015, the leaders of such EU 
candidates and Eastern Partnership states as Serbia, Ukraine, and Moldova, 
in order to show their support for European values, allowed gay pride parades 
to be held and adopted various laws supporting the rights of sexual minorities, 
though such steps were in a glaring opposition to the views of the conservative 
majority in those states (for parades, see BBC News 2014; Moldova.org 2014; 
Tejas 2015; for laws, see, for example, Nichols 2013; Tomkiw 2015). Another 
illustration of soft power’s normative influence is the moratorium on the death 
penalty in Russia, which the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin imposed in 
1996 in order to be able to join the Council of Europe, even though he knew 
that it would be vehemently opposed by society (BBC News 1999). 
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In other cases, the nature of soft power’s influence can be different from 
the normative: authorities can wittingly make an unpopular decision in 
order to express solidarity with their country’s partner if they believe that it 
is in line with national priorities. For instance, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia contributed their troops 
to the coalition forces in Iraq in 2003 and beyond, despite the fact that, 
as opinion polls were indicating, the majority of their citizens resolutely 
opposed the involvement in that war (Hummel 2007: 31–32). Reportedly, 
in most cases, the sending of armed forces to Iraq aimed to generate 
closer ties with, first, NATO in general, and, second, the US in particular, for 
that country had been most actively supporting their westernisation in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the socialist camp (see, for example, New 
Europe 2003; Carroll 2005).
My argument that attracting the elite is often crucial for the applicant 
does not, however, signify that it is always sufficient: in certain cases, the 
applicant’s strategy can be shipwrecked if it manages to attract only the 
recipient’s elite but not its public. Failure to attract the recipient’s public 
may, for instance, entail some temporary success, but ruin the strategy’s 
long-term goals. This happened, for example, in November 2013, when 
Russian President Vladimir Putin promised his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor 
Yanukovich a significant discount on gas and a $15 billion bill to get 
him not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, a treaty popular 
among most Ukrainians (The Economist 2013). However, in the end, Russia 
failed to extract a long-term positive effect from that move: as early as 
in February 2014 Yanukovich’s regime broke down as a result of anti-
governmental protests, and the new Ukrainian government signed the 
Association Agreement one month later. A similar story happened in the 
1970s in American-Iranian relations: the US managed to establish a strong 
friendship with the Shah and his government, which boosted US-Iranian 
economic and political cooperation. However, America turned out to 
be incapable of establishing close ties with Iranian civil society, whose 
anti-Americanism eventually triggered the 1979 anti-Shah Revolution that 
completely buried the bilateral friendship (Zanchetta 2009; Wise 2011). 
In both examples, the soft power applicants enjoyed short-term positive 
effects as a result of their strategies, while in the long run they, on the 
contrary, suffered a sizeable deterioration in the bilateral relations with 
the recipient.
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In other cases, failure to affect the recipient’s public may result in a less 
considerable, but still tangible failure of the applicant’s strategy. An 
illustrative example is the failure of the proposers of same-sex marriage 
at a public referendum in Slovenia in December 2015. EU officials that 
supported the idea of legalising gay marriages managed to gain the 
support of the Slovenian authorities, which had passed a corresponding 
law in March 2015. However, that law never actually entered into force: 
some conservative organisations managed to collect a sufficient number 
of signatures to initiate a referendum on the issue, where the majority 
of voters voted against same-sex marriages (Heath 2015; Oliveira 2015). 
To cite another example, in 2005 the project of a European Constitution 
was widely promoted by EU officials and supported by the elites of the EU 
member states. Nonetheless, it was quite unexpectedly rejected at the 
referendums in France and the Netherlands, which revealed a considerable 
gap between politicians and populations: as the then Prime Minister of the 
Netherlands Peter Balkenende said, “[t]he idea of Europe has lived for the 
politicians, but not the Dutch people” (The Guardian 2005).
Nonetheless, for some reasons I believe that researchers must take into 
account the applicant’s ability to attract the elite even in the cases 
where it is the public who plays a decisive role. First, if the recipient’s public 
favours the decision promoted by the applicant and the elite does not, 
attracting the latter can fasten remarkably the process of achieving the 
outcome favoured by the applicant. If affecting the current authorities of 
the recipient is not possible due to, for instance, their strong obstinacy, it 
can also be reasonable to establish close links with the political opposition, 
especially if the incumbent government is weak and likely to lose the 
impending elections. If, for instance, the above-cited case of the 2014 
Ukrainian revolution is to be considered from the perspective of the EU, its 
success in enlisting the support of the Ukrainian opposition leaders made it 
possible to get the Association Agreement signed already in March 2014, 
which the EU had been seeking for several years. 
Second, whereas civil society may indeed impede the taking of certain 
particular decisions, general policies are still normally in the hands of the 
government. Therefore, should the recipient’s elite favour a certain soft 
power applicant, the overall policies of the former will most probably be 
in line with its wants. For instance, although the Slovenian government, as 
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I mentioned before, failed to legalise same-sex marriage, as promoted 
by the EU, through a referendum due to the reluctance of the country’s 
citizenry, it still managed to take numerous other measures to promote 
tolerance toward gay people (see University of Toronto 2014). To give 
another example, the Berlusconi government of Italy, wary of public 
resistance, decided to not send ground troops to Afghanistan to support 
the US-led anti-terrorist operation in 2001–2002; however, it backed its 
ally in many other ways, including providing some military assistance 
(Davidson 2009: 301).
Unfortunately, academic papers often neglect the elite dimension of soft 
power strategies, which leads to incomplete or even distorted conclusions. 
For instance, in her research on Russia’s soft power strategy in Crimea in 
the 2000s, Roslycky (2011) took account of its various local “conductors” 
and receivers, considered the attitude of Ukraine’s central government 
to Russian activities on the peninsula, but failed to take cognizance of 
the role of the local Crimean elite and authorities. Nevertheless, as 
subsequent events showed, it was the Crimean elite’s support of Russia 
that played a decisive role in the 2014 annexation of the peninsula: hardly 
any Crimean politician tried to protest against it, which made it extremely 
easy for Russia to carry out the occupation. After the annexation, most 
of the Crimean elite remained in the government simply by changing 
their membership from Ukraine’s pro-Russian “Party of Regions” to Russia’s 
ruling “United Russia” party.
Another example is Sadowski’s (2015) study of Poland’s soft power strategy 
in Eastern Europe, in which he draws attention to the importance of Belarus 
and Ukraine for Poland’s soft power activities: “Poland is far more active in 
Ukraine and Belarus than in Moldova and Georgia. Cultural and historical 
proximity, and political and economic importance, are important factors 
influencing the higher level of engagement in Ukraine and Belarus” 
(ibid: 77). In his opinion, it is Poland’s soft power activities that explain 
the positive image of Poles among Ukrainians and Belarusians, which 
becomes apparent in opinion polls. Later, he also maintains that Ukraine 
shows a substantial interest in using the Polish experience of reforms and 
transition, but does not mention anything similar in relation to Belarus (ibid: 
78). A logical question that arises is why, even though Poland is active in 
both countries and both nations feel positive about the Poles, only Ukraine 
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cooperates with Poland politically? Much of the answer seems to lie in 
the fact that Poland, focusing on Belarusian civil society as a receiver of 
its soft power strategy, pays insufficient attention to Belarus’ elite, which is 
known to be pro-Russian and, thus, quite unamicable to Poland, Russia’s 
strong opponent.
Sources and Instruments of Soft Power
Similarly to any kind of a purposeful action, a soft power strategy has its 
sources and instruments (or means) through which it can be achieved. 
Soft power sources,3 as follows from a narrow understanding of soft power, 
are a country’s distinctive features that generate attraction. The problem 
of defining a concrete list of sources has been extensively debated in 
the academic literature and lies beyond the scope of this article (for a 
discussion, see, for instance, Fan 2008; Vuving 2009; Hall 2010; Nye 2011b), 
but the most commonly applied in country-focused case studies are the 
ones proposed by Nye (2004): a country’s “culture (in places where it is 
attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home 
and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate 
and having moral authority)” (11). A soft power strategy’s instruments 
are mechanisms through which an applicant transmits the influential 
capacity of its sources to the receivers, i.e. the elite and the public of a 
recipient country. Nye, for instance (2011b), singles out four main channels 
through which states can use their soft power, notably “public diplomacy, 
broadcasting, exchanges, and assistance”4 (94).
 It is noteworthy that in Nye’s theory the distinction between the two is 
somewhat elusive: while there is a clear logical discrimination between 
sources and instruments, sometimes they coincide, which is deemed to 
be a weak point of Nye’s theory. In his above-mentioned “culture, values, 
3 I deliberately do not use the word “strategy” in the definition, since obviously there is no difference between “sources 
of soft power” and “sources of a soft power strategy”: whether or not soft power affects the recipient with or without 
a state-led rational strategy, it has the same foundations.
4 Importantly, these lists of sources and instruments are not exhaustive: in the end, a any feature of a country can serve 
as a source of hard or soft power depending if it is used in a coercive or co-optive way. For instance, culture can be a 
source of hard power if it is aggressively imposed rather than peacefully promoted. And military forces can produce 
soft power if they are used to keep peace (for details, see Nye 2011b).
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foreign policy” triad, with respect to what concerns values the distinction 
is clear: they are a source that is promoted by an applicant through 
broadcasting and various public diplomacy programs. However, as for 
foreign policy, Nye’s interpretation seems to be semi-tautological: “other 
actors will support an attractive foreign policy, the attractiveness of which 
is defined by the degree to which other actors support it” (Hall 2010: 
204). Put differently, foreign policy represents a collision of a soft power 
strategy’s sources, instruments, and even goals, which has engendered 
some criticism of Nye’s approach.
Despite such occasional overlaps, my argument is that, in case study 
research, where possible, it is preferable to, first, clearly differentiate 
between sources and instruments, and, second, consider both aspects. 
First of all, this is obviously conducive to the comprehensiveness of the 
analysis: so as to find out how and why a certain goal has (not) been 
achieved, it is logical to first estimate the applicant’s potential, and then 
analyse the ways it was meant to be translated into the outcome. However, 
incompleteness is only one of the possible negative consequences to 
which omitting sources or instruments in a case study may lead. What 
is more important, this can result in a faulty conclusion in the following 
several ways.
The first common flaw of country-focused case studies is to consider merely 
the sources of soft power for the assessment of its effectiveness. Authors 
doing so fail to treat soft power as a rational strategy and, hence, link 
the applicant’s (un-)popularity solely to its soft power sources, which can 
bring about two central misconceptions. First, if a country does not possess 
many sources, it does not necessarily mean that it cannot be popular 
anywhere: a strategic approach shows that a country can be “powerful” 
in a “soft” way even if it does not possess many sources, but wisely uses the 
ones it disposes of. The examples of such cases are the use of animé and 
manga by Japan in the absence of a popular foreign policy (Lam 2007: 
350), the application of the rhetoric of anti-Americanism by Russia in the 
absence of popular values (Trilupaityte 2008), and so forth. Conversely, if 
a certain country is unpopular somewhere, it is not necessarily caused by 
the imperfections or shortage of its soft power sources: the answer, again, 
may lie in how wise a country disposes of its soft power potential. India, 
in the opinions of some scholars, has great soft power potential, but its 
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international image is hampered by the fact that it does not undertake 
sufficient and adequate measures to promote it (Mukherjee 2014: 48–49).
This argument is in concordance with a broader approach in political 
science, which posits that power should preferably be measured in 
terms of outcomes rather than resources (Hart 1976; Gallarotti 2011: 41). 
At the same time, a number of scholars contend that in certain cases 
a resource-based assessment of power can also be useful; for example, 
when it comes to policy-makers making forecasts: “in general, a country 
that is well endowed with power resources is more likely to affect a weaker 
country and be less dependent upon an optimal strategy than vice versa” 
(Nye 2011a: 12). However, although I agree that there is a grain of truth 
in this reasoning, I still believe that a resource-based approach is more 
suitable for policy-makers who have to make decisions immediately, but 
not academic researchers who normally have enough time to analyse an 
issue thoroughly. Also, I believe that a resource-based approach is more 
applicable to hard power, as it is easier to quantify its resources, while 
in the case of soft power there is no objective scale to use in assessing 
it, which can often lead to the overvaluation or underestimation of the 
applicant’s potential.
On the contrary, treating a country’s popularity merely as a function of 
its soft power instruments – in other words, equating soft power with the 
measures a state takes to promote itself and disregard its potential to do 
so – is equally questionable. On the one hand, such an approach to soft 
power displays strategic thinking in terms of purposeful behaviour, which 
is certainly good. However, this vision contradicts a rule of sales theory, 
according to which a good product does not need much advertising and 
a bad product will not sell no matter how hard it is promoted. As Anholt 
(2009) fairly argues, “Many countries have wasted enormous sums of 
public money on communications campaigns, based on the assumption 
that people don’t respect their country simply because they don’t know 
enough about it. In most cases, they are deluding themselves, and the 
real reason why their country has a negative reputation is that it doesn’t 
deserve a positive one” (90). Consequently, omitting soft power sources in 
a case study is fraught with the possibility that a researcher will ascribe a 
country’s good (or bad) reputation solely to its actions, while in fact it can 
be rooted in its soft power sources.
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The Factor of Competition
While the aforementioned points, although undertheorized, are frequently, 
at least subconsciously, “implied” in case studies, the applicant’s 
competitors are a factor which fails to be considered far more commonly, 
notwithstanding the fact that in certain cases it is of critical importance for 
the evaluation of a soft power strategy. My general argument here is that 
sometimes the way in which a soft power strategy is carried out is highly 
influenced by the fact of the presence (or absence) of some competing 
country. There are two main aspects that it affects. First, a competitor 
has an impact on the level of intensity of the applicant’s activities: a 
feeling that its rival can get ahead in a certain territory can motivate the 
applicant to put more efforts into promoting its image there. In practice, 
it can be reflected in increasing the quantity of some type of resources: 
allocating more money, engaging more people, paying more attention 
to media coverage, etc. Second, the existence of a competitor can 
make the applicant alter the content of its activities toward the recipient 
in an original way by resorting to steps it does not use in other countries. In 
the summer of 2015, for instance, the EU discussed the need to create a 
special TV channel to counter Russian propaganda in Eastern European 
countries, where it is particularly strong (Jozwiak 2015). 
Naturally, most soft power strategies exist in a sort of competition: indeed, 
if a country decides to intentionally cope with its image somewhere, in 
many cases it is due to the existence of some forces that aim to worsen 
it. Nonetheless, it does not mean that country-focused case studies must 
take any competitor into account: rather, they should consider only 
those competitors who seem to have a chance to seriously affect the 
applicant’s soft power. Such “seriousness”, of course, differs from one 
case to another; however, there are several conditions, the presence of 
which, to my mind, signalises a researcher that the factor of competition 
between applicants must be necessarily considered in the analysis.
First of all, the principle of geographical proximity appears significant: 
the closer a competitor is to the recipient, the more it has to be taken in 
account in the analysis. The importance of proximity is mostly determined 
by the fact that soft power applicants tend to treat their neighbours as 
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territories of special concern and strategic influence, which is even often 
reflected in their official documents and the speeches of their leaders. For 
example, Brazil’s top priority, in general and in terms of soft power, is South 
Africa (Latin American Herald Tribune 2011) and the main direction of 
Russian foreign policy is CIS countries (MFA of Russia 2013). Also, proximity 
simplifies the use of soft power instruments from a practical point of view: it 
dramatically reduces transportation and other transaction costs, ensures 
a high level of familiarity among the citizens of two countries, etc.
The second factor that makes a competitor an important influencer on 
a soft power strategy is the presence of an influential group inside the 
recipient state that supports that competitor. Depending on the country, 
that group can be an opposition party, a secessionist movement, a 
religious movement, a financial group, etc. “Influential” in this case 
simply implies possessing enough power, will, and resources to aid the 
competitor in achieving its goals. To cite an example, in the on-going 
EU-Russia geopolitical rivalry in Moldova, both applicants have weighty 
supporters inside the country: the EU enjoys the support of the incumbent 
pro-European coalition, while Russia relies upon its close ties with the 
breakaway region of Transnistria and the Gagauz Autonomous Region 
(Dempsey 2014). A similar, but somewhat less illustrative of this point, is 
the competition between China and Japan/the US in Taiwan, where the 
former enjoys the support of the Kuomintang party while the latter side is 
backed by the Democratic Progressive Party (Lin 2016). Due to this, hardly 
any study of the EU’s or Russia’s soft power in Moldova as well as China’s 
or the US’ soft power in Taiwan can be comprehensive if it fails to consider 
the factor of the competing side’s presence. 
Finally, there exists one more factor that determines the importance of 
a competitor for the result of a soft power strategy: the receivers (the 
recipient’s population and elite) must preferably view the situation as a 
strict choice between two applicants, as a zero-sum game with little or 
no possibility of a win-win outcome. The applicants, in turn, must have 
divergent goals, otherwise the whole situation can, at a deeper look, 
turn out not to be a real competition, but, rather, a minor disagreement 
between the applicants over technical issues, with their goals being similar. 
In such cases, even though there may be heated debates between the 
applicants, a compromise is, in fact, frequently more than possible. For 
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instance, at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest the German and US 
delegations argued over offering membership action plans to Ukraine and 
Georgia: George Bush was insisting on it, while Angela Merkel was arguing 
that they were not stable enough to be granted membership action plans, 
so she proposed not to go beyond close military cooperation between 
NATO and those countries. Despite the heatedness of their argument, 
which was about to grow into a big scandal, a compromise was eventually 
found: both Georgia and Ukraine were promised membership in the 
future, which was pointed out in the final communiqué of the summit, but 
the date of their invitation to the alliance was not indicated (Myers and 
Bowley 2008). In this example, first, the recipients were considering both 
Germany and the US to be friendly actors, since at that time the goal of 
both the Ukrainian and Georgian governments was to get closer to the 
West in order to be protected from Russia, which in order to achieve they 
were reliant on both European and American aid. Second, the goals of 
both applicants – Germany and the US – were also very similar, only their 
methods differed. So, any case studies on the soft power strategies of 
one of these two applicants with respect to Georgia or Ukraine during 
that period may omit considering the impact of the other applicant’s soft 
power, since it did not significantly affect the outcome.
It can also be possible that only the applicants view a certain situation 
as a competition, while the receivers do not consider it a strict choice 
between two options and want to take advantage of the cooperation 
with both applicants. In such cases, a situation can be initially deemed 
as a potential competition rather than an actual one; nonetheless, it can 
be transformed into an actual one if the receivers change their minds. 
Sometimes this happens with an intervention of hard power. For instance, 
in the beginning of the 2010s the EU proposed Ukraine conclude an 
association agreement and, at the same time, Russia also invited Ukraine 
to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. At first, Ukraine 
tried to find a way to take advantage of both integration groups (Buckley 
2012); however, later both applicants objected to this policy, forcing 
Ukraine to make a strict choice. Originally, Ukraine deliberately chose the 
EU, but, as it was getting ready to sign the association agreement Russia 
started to apply its hard power tools widely, such as threats to impose 
sanctions, intervene militarily (Walker 2013) as well as blatant bribery 
(McElroy 2013), which finally made Ukraine stop its EU integration attempts: 
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in November 2013, its Premier Mykola Azarov suspended the signing of the 
agreement. In this example, the EU-Russian rivalry in Ukraine was, in fact, in 
its “passive” phase until all its participants, including the recipient, began 
to view the situation in competitive terms.
Conclusion: The Use and Limitations of the 
Aggregative Model
Once again, the proposed framework, especially with respect to what 
concerns its “competition” and “elite” components, is useful mainly for 
studies that aim to analyse soft power as a tool of realpolitik. In practice, 
this implies that the model is hardly applicable to states that do not really 
pursue political goals in their strategies, instead seeking to improve their 
overseas image for other ends, like attracting investments, tourists, etc. 
Another limitation of the model is that it presupposes a rivalry between 
two or more countries in a third country, supposing that the applicant 
either does not, in turn, get affected by the recipient’s soft power, or gets 
affected so insignificantly that this impact can be left out. In other words, 
the framework is not apt for analysing mutual soft power competitions 
between applicants (situations in which one applicant is simultaneously 
the recipient of its opponent’s strategy), since it requires a complicated 
analysis of government-opposition and elite-public relations, which moves 
the study away from the International Relations field.
The paper leaves several questions for future research. The role of 
competitors, to my mind, must be better tested on case studies and, if it 
turns out to be possible, we may come up with a theory of “soft power 
games,”5 that is, interstate rivalries where only “soft” methods, such as 
attraction, persuasion or framing the agenda, are used. Once defined, 
soft power games will have to be characterized: we will need a typology 
of soft power games, their main characteristics and conditions. Another 
question concerns the limitations of the “strategic” approach to soft 
power: government-led strategies, as many authors maintain, are not 
5 In fact, this term already appears in academic literature and newspapers, but is mostly used as a figurative collocation 
rather than an academic term (see, for example, Lee 2010: 11; Rengma 2012; Van Herpen 2016: 28)
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able to achieve everything – much of national image originates in the 
activities of its civil society and private sector as well as culture, history, 
national character and other conditions (see, for instance, Nye 2013). 
However impossible it may seem to separate the government and 
non-government “contributions” to a country’s overseas image, such 
an assessment (at least a rough one) must be done in order to find out 
to what extent a national image as such is manageable with rational 
governmental strategies.
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